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TORT

LAW-SURVIVAL OF ACTION-PROPRIETY OF EXPANDING
MASSACHUSETTS SURVIVAL STATUTE TO EMBRACE INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTREss-Harrison v. Loyal Protective

Life Insurance Co., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 N.E.2d 987.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance CO.l probed the
question whether an action in tort for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress survives the victim's death. Marie Harrison, ad
ministratrix of her husband's estate, brought this action in January
1978 in the Suffolk County Superior Court following her husband's
death from cancer.2 Defendants included her husband's former em
ployer, Loyal Protective Life Insurance Company (Loyal), Loyal's
Board Chairman, Victor Sayyah, and Edward Fitzwilliam, an officer
of the company.3 Plaintiff alleged that Fitzwilliam knew Harrison
had terminal cancer. Because of his illness, Harrison was precluded
from working and was required to submit a claim for physical disa
bility benefits.. Fitzwilliam allegedly threatened Harrison, declaring
that if he sought the benefits to which he was entitled, Harrison's
position with Loyal would be terminated. 4
Mrs. Harrison apparently felt that her husband's condition was
exacerbated by the dilemma over whether to apply for benefits. She
submitted that as a result of this dilemma, her husband suffered
mental distress and severe anguish. 5 Implicit in the complaint was
the contention that because of defendants' conduct, the quality of
Harrison's remaining life was greatly diminished. Plaintiff averred
that Fitzwilliam's action constituted a deliberate infliction of mental
harm and, as a direct result, Harrison lost all hope of living. His
I. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 N.E.2d 987 (1979).
2. Id. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 988. Sayyah was Chairman of the Board of Directors
and leading shareholder in the Holding Corporation of America, which controlled Loyal
Protective Life Insurance Company. Fitzwilliam was alleged to actually have committed
the tort. Id.
3. Brief for Appellant, app. at 3, Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 1979
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 N.E.2d 987 [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant).
4. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 988. Because the trial court dis
missed the action without making findings of fact, the supreme judicial court summa
rized the facts from plaintiffs complaint. See id. at 2484, 396 N.E.2d at 991-92.
S. Id. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 988.
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state of mind may well have led to his physical deterioration and
ultimate death from cancer.6
Mrs. Harrison's prayer for judgment was dismissed in the supe
rior court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 7 The court held that the cause of action did not survive Mr.
Harrison's death. 8 Plaintiff later sought review in the appeals court;
and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, on its own initiative,
ordered direct appellate review. 9 Chief Justice Hennessey authored
a reversal of the superior court's determination and held that the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, whether accompanied
by physical injury or not, survives the death of both the victim and
the tortfeasor. lO
The Commonwealth's survival statute I I permits survival of tort
actions for "assault, battery, imprisonment or other damage to the
person."12 Harrison rejected a longstanding policy in Massachusetts
that had constrained the survival statute's operation to include only
those actions resulting in physical harm to a victim. 13 The basis for
this policy has not been articulated clearly but seems to be a vestige
ofthe common-law rule wherein tort actions abated at the death of a
party.14 This common-law mandate has been modified by statute;15
but, according to the traditional construction of "damage to the per
son," damage of a physical character was required. '6 Prior to Harri
son, mental or emotional injuries, such as those sustained by
plaintiffs husband, would not have triggered the statute and the
right of action would have been extinguished at death. Such a re
strictive reading of "damage to the person" would deny redress in a
6. Brief for Appellant, app. at 9, supra note 3. Mrs. Harrison sought to recover one
million dollars in damages against Fitzwilliam and against Loyal and Sayyah under a
theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 5-6.
7. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 988.
8. Id. at 2477-78,396 N.E.2d at 988.
9. Id. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 988.
10. Id. at 2482, 396 N.E.2d at 991.
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1 (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1981). The
survival statute provides that "[i]n addition to the actions which survive by the common
law, the following shall survive ... (2) Actions of tort (a) for assault, battery imprison
ment or other damage to the person; . . . ." Id.
12. Id.
13. See cases cited notes 57 & 76 infra.
14. See Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 84-85, 138 N.E. 808, 809 (1923). This
common-law rule was expressed in the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona.
Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 214, 338 P.2d 702, 707 (1959).
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1 (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
16. Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 86, 138 N.E. 808, 809-10 (1923).
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case that, at minimum, warrants jury consideration.I7
William Shakespeare once advised, "Things without ... rem
edy should be without regard; what's done is done."18 This sugges
tion of resignation, however, is at odds with the maxim of the law
that for every wrong there is a remedy. 19 Harrison resolved this con
flict in two steps. First, it affirmed earlier deCisions estab~shing that
the right to mental tranquility is a protected interest and that dam
ages are appropriate for an intentional disruption of peace ofmind. 20
Second, in sustaining the validity of an action based on this disrup
tion, the supreme judicial court considered the nature of the tort.
The. court held that the intentional infliction of emotional distress
constitutes "damage to the person" and thereby survives the victim's
death. 21 In the final analysis, Harrison embraced the belief that "the
business of the law [is] to remedy wrongs that deserve it . . . ."22
This note will examine the survival statute and the changing
judicial conceptions of the statute's scope. An analysis of how the
statutory language is construed will demonstrate that 3;n expansive
reading of "damage to the person" is warranted. Additionally, a dis
cussion of policy considerations attending actions for emotional dis
tress will underscore the propriety of allowing Mr. Harrison's cause
of action to survive his death.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Common-Law Nonsurvival Rule

Mrs. Harrison's action based on her husband's injury survived
his death because the supreme judicial court placed intentional in
fliction of emotional distress within the phrase "damage to the per
son." The survival statute thus operated to defeat defendants' claim
17. "Because reasonable men could differ on these issues, ... 'it is for the jury,
subject to the control of the court,' to determine whether there should be liability. . . ."
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145,355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1976) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment h (1965».
18. W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, III, ii, II.
19. Throckmorton, f)amages/or Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260, 265 (1921).
20. In George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971), the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court imposed liability for intentionally causing severe
emotional distress with resulting bodily harm. Id. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. This ruling
was extended in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976), in
which the court held "that one who, by extreme and outrageous conduct and without
privilege, causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo
tional distress even though no bodily harm may result." Id. at 144,355 N.E.2d at 318.
21. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2482, 396 N.E.2d at 991.
22. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971).
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that the cause of action abated at the death of plaintifi?s husband. 23
Part of the significance of Harrison lies in its juxtaposing emotional
trauma with the concept of damage to the person. This expansive
view deviates from the supreme judicial court's traditional reading
of the survival statute, which has been more typical of the stringent,
common-law nonsurvival rule. 24 Generally, new legal theories may
be analyzed and supported by viewing older approaches from an up
dated perspective. Tracing the development of the common-law
rule, which terminated tort actions at the party's death, highlights the
haphazard evolution of nonsurvival and vindicates Chief Justice
Hennessey's judicious construction.
At early common law, tort actions did not survive the death of
either the person injured or the wrongdoer: As the actor died, so
died the action. 25 "This [abatement] was expressed 'in the maxim
actio personalis moritur cum persona ."26 Although this is a familiar
maxim of English law, its origin and significance are obscure. 27 It
has been speculated that the nonsurvival rule developed because,
historically, tort remedies were associated with criminal law and
were vindictive in nature. 28 Early civil actions were closely allied
with criminal appeals of felony, thus damage awards originally were
"regarded as a matter of personal vengeance and punishment."29 A
party's death, therefore, erased the purpose of a civil action.
The alliance between embryonic tort law and criminal law30
fostered the reasoning that "[s]ince the defendant could not be pun
ished when he was dead, it was natural to regard his demise as termi
nating the criminal action, and tort liability with it."31 The
23. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2480, 396 N.E.2d at 990.
24. See generally cases cited notes 57 & 76 infra.
25. Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 67 (1913). The common-law
prohibition against survival did not apply to contract actions, but did apply to tort ac
tions "founded on malfeasance or misfeasance to the person or property of an
other. . . ." Hooper v. Gorham, 45 Me. 209, 213 (1858).
26. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 214, 338 P.2d 702, 707
(1959). See also Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 239
(1929).
27. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 214, 338 P.2d 702, 707
(1959).
28. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 898 (nonsurvival rule was result of devel
opment of tort remedy as "an adjunct and incident to criminal punishment"); Winfield,
supra note 26, at 242 (civil remedy had strong quasi-criminal character).
29. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases ofthe Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV.
605, 608 (1960).
30. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 214, 338 P.2d 702, 708
(1959).
31. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 898.
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association between tort and criminal matters, however, became
more tenuous as the function of damages shifted from punitive to
compensatory purposes. 32 The principle of monetary compensation
was furthered; and the civil action was extricated from its roots in
. criminallaw. 33
Although the genesis of actio personalis moritur cum persona
largely is speculative, its justification is apparent. Because of the
perceived affinity between the tort of trespass and criminal law, the.
abatement of the punitive action logically might have been extended
to the newer civil proceeding. "If one has the habit of looking upon
a wrong as something very like a crime, it is a natural inference that
none ought to be liable for it except the man who committed it. "34
This justification no longer is valid. Civil remedies no longer
are perceived as appendages of criminal law; the nonsurvival rule
therefore is archaic. Actio personalis moritur cum persona has been
subjected to universal criticism condemning it as unfounded and un
just.35 Assuming as its basis the vindictive character of suits for civil
injuries, "once the notion of vengeance has been put aside and that
of compensation substituted, the rule. . . seems to be without plausi
ble ground."36 Accordingly, the nonsurvival mandate has been de
scribed as one of the least rational concepts of our law. 37 Its roots
are found in "archaic conceptions of remedy which have long since
lost their validity. The reason having ceased the rule is out of place
and ought not to be perpetrated."38
Applications of the rule have been perceived as arbitrary. For
example, while personal tort actions always have died with the per
son, contract actions, which are equally personal, have survived. 39
32. Smedley, supra note 29, at 607 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id.
34. Winfield, supra note 26, at 242.
35. See, e.g., Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 216, 338 P.2d
702,708 (1959) ("non-survival rule is a vestige of the ancient concept of violent torts, and
owes its existence to historical accident and blind adherence to precedent"); Rodgers v.
Ferguson, 89 N.M. 688, 691, 556 P.2d 844, 847 (Ct. App.) (no valid justification for com
mon-law nonsurvival rule), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976); Moyer v.
Philips, 462 Pa. 395, 399, 341 A.2d 441, 442-43 (1975) (survival statutes enacted to modify
harsh and unjust rule of common law); Note, Inadequacies of English and State Survival
Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1008,1012 (1935) (limited scope of survival rule attributa
ble to conservatism of legislatures).
36. Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 398, 341 A.2d 441, 442 (1975) (quoting F. POL
LACK, LAW OF TORTS 62 (12th ed. 1923».
37. Id.
38. McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 494, 216 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1966).
39. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 898.
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"Neither the distinction between tort and contract nor that between
injuries to personalty and those to property has been consistently fol
lowed in determining survival."40 The criticism against the nonsur
vival doctrine has weighed overwhelmingly in favor of its
abrogation. 41

B. Statutory Alteration

of the Common-Law Rule

This obloquy prompted statutory alteration to such a degree
that, at present, little remains of the nonsurvival rule in its original
form. The stringent effects of nonsurvival have been ameliorated
over the years. The first inroad on the ancient rule, albeit a small
one, was made by the Statute of Marlborough in 1267, which al
lowed survival of actions commenced by abbotts for the recovery of
stolen church goods. 42 In 1327, Parliament enacted the Statute of
Westminster, which provided executors of the estates of those slain
in a recently concluded civil war with an action for replevin of their
testators' personalty.43 Three years later, a more significant altera
tion was provided by an act allowing survival in favor of executors
who sought recovery of their testators' goods and chattels from tres
passers.44 "And there for nearly five centuries the law stood almost
still."45
.
The impact of these enactments on the nonsurvival rule was
minimal. "These statutes did not cover torts against land, and made
no provision for survival of the death of the defendant. . . ."46 Par
liament, however, took bolder action with legislation in 1833.47 The
1833 Act allowed suits in trespass or case for wrongs to the real or
personal property of the victim against the executor or administrator
of the wrongdoer's estate. 48 This series of revisions culminated, in
40. Note, supra note 35, at 1008-09.
41. "We have nothing positive to say in defence [sic) of the maxim [the nonsurvival
rule). If it were elided from our legal literature, nothing would be lost." Winfield, supra
note 26, at 253. The rule "has no champion at this date, nor has any judge or law writer
risen to defend it for 200 years past." Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 581,
162 S.W. 584, 586 (1914).
42. 52 Hen. III, c. 28 (1267).
43. I Edw. III, c. 3 (1327).
44. Statute of Westminster, 1330,4 Edw. III, c. 7. ''The Act of 1330 did not cover
injuries to a man's person, freehold, or personal reputation . . . ." Winfield, supra note
26, at 243.
45. Winfield, supra note 26, at 243.
46. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 899.
47. Civil Procedure Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 42, § 2.
48. Id. "[E)ven here, the suit was limited to injuries inflicted by the wrongdoer
within six months of his death. Futhermore, courts continued to insist on an enrichment
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England, with the Law Reform Act of 1934, which markedly circum
vented the nonsurvival rule. 49 Under the provisions of this Act, all
causes of action survived, whether for or against the estate of the
decedent. Causes of action for defamation, alienation of affections
in the marital relationship, and seduction specifically were
excluded.50
American courts paralleled the British evolution, which favored
survival of tort actions upon the death of a party.51 Statutes have
modified the common-law rule in all American jurisdictions. 52 The
passage of the Massachusetts survival statute testifies to the antiqua
tion of the common-law doctrine.
C.

The Massachusetts Survival Statute

In Massachusetts survival is "wholly the creature of statute."53
Survival or abatement under the survival statute depends on the na
ture of the wrong sustained, not on the form of the action. 54 Any
case falling within the ambit of the statute will survive if the action is
based on one of the enumerated torts or if the character of the al
leged injury fits the rubric of "damage to the person."55 The policy
behind the statute seems confused because of a contradictory posture
of the wrongdoers' assets in order for the suit to survive against his representative." Ma
Ione, The Genesis 0/ Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1047 (1965).
49. See id.
50. Note, supra note 35, at 1010.
51. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 899. "In a variety of cases, in order to
extend the remedy against the representatives of a party deceased, the form of the action
[had) been changed so as to evade the application of strict technical rules." Stebbins v.
Palmer, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 71, 75 (1822) (emphasis in original).
52. " '[T)he rule has been the subject of legislative modification both in England
and America.''' Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 220, 338 P.2d
702,710 (1959) (quoting Kelley v. Union Pac. R.R., 16 Colo. 455, 457, 27 P. 1058, 1059
(1891»; see Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims/or and
Against Executors and Administrators, 29 MICH. L. REV. 969 (1931).
There is a distinction between survival statutes and wrongful death statutes:
Acts designed to alter the common-law restriction on the transmission of tort
claims or tort liability at death are commonly known as survival statutes, while
legislation aimed at establishing a separate cause of action for the benefit of
designated members of the family of a person whose life was wrongfully taken
are usually referred to as wrongful death statutes.
Malone, supra note 48, at 1044.
53. Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 85, 138 N.E. 808, 809 (1923) (citing Duggan v.
Bay St. Ry., 230 Mass. 370, 376, 119 N.E. 757, 759 (1918».
54. Id. at 88, 138 N.E. at 810; Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 476, 84 N.E. 141, 142
(1908); Cutter v. Hamien, 147 Mass. 471, 473, 18 N.E. 397, 398 (1888).
55. See, e.g., Stebbins v. Palmer, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 71, 74 (1822); Note, supra note
35, at 1008.
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assumed by the Massachusetts courts. The nonsurvival rule has
been denigrated,56 yet, prior to Harrison, the courts narrowly con
strued "damage to the person" and imposed stringent restraints on
the operation of the survival statute. 57 An analysis of Massachusetts
cases spotlights the bifurcated approach tak-en by the courts.
An 1822 case, Stebbins v. Palmer,58 illustrates the dichotomy
that the supreme judicial court tried to resolve in Harrison. 59 Steb
bins involved an action for breach of promise to marry, a cause held
to abate at the jilted party's death. The opinion emphasized the na
ture of the injury and focused on the substance of the action rather
than on its form or name. 60 Breach of promise to marry, an action
based on disappointed hope and violated faith, was said to be
"merely personal," distinguishing it from a cause of action that
would survive a party's death. 61 "Merely personal" actions, accord
ing to the court's reasoning, died with the person. 62 Dicta in Steb
bins suggested the threshold of survival under the statute: If a cause
of action was based on a personal right of the deceased, something to
which an administrator could be neither party nor privy, the action
abated. Conversely, an injury that depleted the victim's estate, or
enriched that of the perpetrator, was held to trigger the statute and
56. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § I (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
57. See Dixon v. Amerman, 181 Mass. 430, 63 N.E. 1057 (1902) (action for crimi
nal conversation and consequent loss of consortium not within survival statute); Cutter v.
Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N.E. 397 (1888) (survival of action depends on nature of
damage sued for); Cummings v. Bird, 1I5 Mass. 346 (1874) (despite allegation of damage
to estate resulting from alleged libel, action abated at plaintiffs death); Norton v. Sewall,
106 Mass. 143 (1870) ("damage to the person" extends only to harm resulting from bod
ily injury); Nettleton v. Dinehart, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 543 (1850) (survival statute does not
embrace action such as malicious prosecution, which ordinarily involves personal char
acter of deceased); Smith v. Sherman, 58 Mass. (I Cush.) 408 (1849) (survival statute,
which allows action for damage to the person to survive, extends only to injuries of a
physical character); Stebbins v. Palmer, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 71 (1822) (nonsurvival rule
necessitates abatement of action for breach of promise to marry).
58. 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 71 (1822).
59. The Stebbins court read the survival statute very narrowly and yet critized the
nonsurvival rule:
That there are cases where the maxim. . . applies cannot now be contested; but
it is a rule, arbitrary in its commencement, supported only by artificial reason
ing, and often most unjust in its consequences. The Court certainly will not feel
disposed to extend it to cases not clearly coming within its application.
ld. at 74.
60. ld. at 76.
61. ld.
62. "The maxim, actio personalis fmoritur cum personal applies to all personal
wrongs, whether they arise ex contractu or ex dilecto . . . ." ld. at 75.
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inure to the administrator. 63
This careful distinction seems contraposed with the court's re
luctance to adhere to the common-law nonsurvival mandate. On the
one hand, Stebbins strictly limited the' operation of the survival stat
ute; on the other, it denigrated the nonsurvival rule that frustrated
the statute's intent. Later cases embodied this apparent duality of
purpose. For example, Stebbins was a precedent to Smith v. Sher
man,64 a subsequent action for breach of promise to marry. Chief
Justice Shaw interpreted the 1842 version of the survival statute and
opined that "damage to the person" was to be read narrowly. "This
manifestly extends only to damage of a physical character. . . . If
the term 'person' were used in a broader sense, it would extend to
slander and every other possible case of tort, which could not be
intended."65
Chief Justice Shaw circumscribed the survival statute's opera
tion by limiting it to actions based on purely physical injuries. This
concept of "damage to the person" defined the prevailing interpreta
tion, which required actual physical damage. Subsequent causes of
action were lost in cases of malicious prosecution,66 libel,67 and crim
inal conversation68 because the respective injuries were not con
strued as within Smllh's concept of "damage to the person." In 1870,
the same construction was employed in a negligence action that sur
vived the victim's death. Norton v. Sewall69 permitted an adminis
tratrix to maintain an action for personal injuries to her testator, who
negligently was given a fatal dose of poison. 70 Justice Gray postu
lated that "[t]he words damage to the person...do not . . .extend to
torts not directly affecting the person, but only the feelings or reputa
tion, such as breach of promise, slander, or malicious prosecu
tion. . . . But. ..they do include every action, the substantial cause
of which is a bodily injury. . . ."71
Eighteen years after Norton, Justice Holmes provided an inter
esting extension to the statute in Cutler v. Hamlen.1 2 In Cutler, the
63.
at 75-76.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Survival was allowed in cases in which wrongs affected the personal estate. Id.

58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 408 (1849).
Id. at 413.
See, e.g., Nettleton v. Dinehart, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 543 (1850).
See, e.g., Cummings v. Bird, 115 Mass. 346 (1874).
See, e.g., Dixon v. Amerman, 181 Mass. 430, 63 N.E. 1057 (1902).
106 Mass. 143 (1870).
70. Id. at 143.
71. Id. at 145 (citations omitted).
72. 147 Mass. 471, 18 N.E. 397 (1888).
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court denied a motion to dismiss on an allegation that a testator con
tracted diphtheria due to his lessor's deceit in renting him an in
fected house. The victim became sick, unable to work, and helpless
for life as a result of the lessor's action. 73 Justice Holmes looked
beyond the form of the action for deceit and focused on the resulting
injury to plaintiff. Survival was enabled because the injury sustained
was seen as "damage to the person" as contemplated by the statute.
"In such cases the action is not for the deceit alone. . . but for the
damage caused by the deceit. The nature of the damage sued for,
not the nature of its cause, determines whether the action
survives."74
By allowing the action to survive in Culler, Justice Holmes
demonstrated an approach consonant with the view that statutes
dealing with remedies should be construed liberally.75 Injuries to the
person resulting from fraud, as well as from direct force, could in
voke the survival statute. Later courts, however, continued to read
the statute restrictively and required damages from a bodily injury,
or damages of a physical character, as distinguished from those that
are suffered only in the feelings or reputation. 76 The fundamental
consideration in these cases was the nature of the wrong sustained by
the victim. In each instance, the supreme judicial court adhered to
Chief Justice Shaw's theory, posited in Smith, that "damage to the
person" was intended solely to encompass damage of a physical
character. This principle was echoed in every pertinent supreme ju
73. Id. at 472, 18 N.E. at 397.
74. Id. at 473, 18 N.E. at 398.
75. Survival statutes have been described as remedial and interpreted liberally.
See generally McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 m. 2d 487, 492, 216 N.E.2d 140, 143 (1966); Wynn
v. Board of Assessors, 281 Mass. 245, 249, 183 N.E.2d 528,530 (1932); Moyer v. Phillips,
462 Pa. 395,401, 341 A.2d 441, 444 (1975).
76. E.g., Keating v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 209 Mass. 278, 95 N.E. 840 (1911)
(action for damages to father resulting from injury to minor son did not survive father's
death); Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 84 N.E. 141 (1908) (consequential injuries to hus
band arising from injury to wife not viewed as "damage to the person," which included
only damages resulting from direct bodily injury); Wilkins v. Wainwright, 173 Mass. 212,
53 N.E. 397 (1899) (action for injury to plaintiff resulting from assault by defendant's
dogs considered to be of a physical character and, as such, survived defendant's death);
Cummings v. Bird, 115 Mass. 346 (1874) (action abated at plaintiffs death despite allega
tion of damage to estate resulting. from alleged libel); Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143,
(1870) (damage to the person extends only to harm resulting from bodily injury); Walters
v. Nettleton, 59 Mass. ( 5 Cush.) 544 (1850) (action for libel did not survive defendant's
death); Nettleton v. Dinehart, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 543 (1850) (survival statute did not
embrace action such as malicious prosecution, which ordinarily involves personal char
acter of deceased).
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dicial court disposition following Smith. 77
The constraints on survival imposed by Smith and its progeny
apparently stemmed from a blind a<Jherence to the archaic, com
mon-law rule wherein tort actions abated at death. This line of cases
was derived from the strict reading given to the survival statute.
Such a limited application of the statute impeded its purpose in cur
tailing the anachronistic, common-law rule. 78 Harrison rejected the
precedent that required damage of a physical character. This rejec
tion conforms to the state of the law regarding the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, which does not require physical dam
age to a plaintiff before he is entitled to maintain an action. 79 Harri
son incorporated a fair and justifiable interpretation of "damage to
the person" and thereby furthered the purpose of abrogating the
nonsurvival rule. 80
In Harrison, the supreme judicial court, for the first time, con
fronted the specific issue whether emotional distress is an injury con
templated by the phrase "damage to the person."81 The opinion was
based on the court's belief that emotional injury, absent any physical
manifestation, is properly embraced by the statutory phrase. 82 Re
garding intangible, emotional suffering as "damage to the person" is
somewhat aberrant in light of the longstanding precedent requiring
physical injury. Harrison's expansion of the survival statute contra
vened the previously accepted construction and may have stemmed
from the court's recent countenance of claims for emotional distress.
A review of the evolution of judicial decisions toward affording re
. dress for this type of injury underscores the propriety of Harrison.
D. Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress

In 1971, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
first was recognized by Massachusetts courts in George v. Jordan
Marsh CO. 83 The hesitancy of the supreme judicial court to grant
full protection to an individual's peace of mind is not unique to the
Commonwealth. Professor William Prosser concluded, "Notwith
77. See notes 57 & 76 supra.
See notes 42-52 supra and accompanying text.
79. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144,355 N.E.2d 315, 318 (1976).
80. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2481, 396 N.E.2d at 990. See a/so Publix Cab Co. v.
Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 224-25, 338 P.2d 702, 712 (1959); Rodgers v. Fergu
son, 89 N.M. 688, 691, 556 P.2d 844,847 (Ct. App.), cerl. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619
(1976).
81. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 988.
82. Id. at 2482, 396 N.E.2d at 991.
83. 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971).
78.
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standing its early recognition in the assault cases, the law has been
slow to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independ
ent protection even as against intentional invasions."84 Yet, the
evolution toward protecting peace of mind testifies to the validity of
the maxim that mandates a remedy for every wrong.85
Early judicial approaches toward emotional injury, however,
were incompatible with this maxim. In 1888, for example, courts in
England and the United States simultaneously denied recovery for
injuries from nervous shock. 86 Damages would not be awarded for
injuries due to fright without physical impact. Compensation, how
ever, was allowed in cases wherein mental distress was caused by a
tortiously inflicted physical injury,87 or where an action for emo
tional injury could be couched in terms of a recognized tort. 88 In this
sense, damages for mental injury were seen as parasitic to the in
dependent tort. 89 Thus, in cases such as assault, damages for mental
suffering could be assessed as a recoverable item.90 The early courts,
84. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 49.
85. "If the rule against recovery is not based on reason, it may be expected to yield
to that which is more in conformity with the maxim of the la~ that for every wrong there
is a remedy." Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 265.
86.. An early English case, Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222 (1888),
denied plaintiff recovery for nervous shock caused by defendant's negligence absent
proof of actual impact. The court explained that a "mere nervous shock caused by fright
of an impending event which never happens results from the constitution and circum
stances of the individual, and does not give a cause of action, to support which there
must be physical injury. . . ." Id. at 222. A similar holding was obtained contempora
neously in the United States, where plaintiff was denied damages for physical injuries
due to fright without physical impact. Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 Hun. 355 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1888).
87. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); Note,
The Right to Mental Security, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 540, 541 (1964).
88.
It may well be . . . that the practice of including [mental suffering] in
recoverable damages arose at a time when courts were not able to force their
conceptions of legal injuries on juries, that one reason for continuing to recog
nize it is that the jury always will include it, whether they should do so or
not. . . . Other instances where "mental suffering" is a recoverable item of
damages in connection with a cause of action already recognized at law are
frequent and well known. . . .
Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497, 509 (1922)
(footnote omitted).
89. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 12, at 52. The parasitic nature of damages for
emotional distress foreshadowed their future recognition as an independent tort. "'The
treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transi
tory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as parasitic will. . . .
tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability.' " Goodrich, supra note 88,
at 510-11 (quoting T. STREET, FOUNDATION OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906».
90. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 12, at 52. The question arises as to why assault
actions were permitted as independent torts while actions for mental suffering were not.
Mental suffering may result from words "which were more insulting, unendurable and
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in barring recovery for injury resulting from mere mental distur
bance, were oblivious to the paradox that parasitic damages were
freely recoverable while independent torts of intentional infliction of
emotional distress were denied. 91 The leading case of Spade v. Lynn
& Boston R.R.92 alluded to the policy considerations that prompted
Massachusetts courts to embrace this rule.
In Spade, Justice Allen established the "impact requirement,"
which held that bodily injury could cause mental suffering. Recov
ery for mental distress was proper if it was preceded by physical in
jury.93 Spade recognized that mental suffering constitutes an actual
personal injury that can proximately flow from a defendant's action
and produce physical consequences. Justice Allen questioned the ra
tionality of allowing damages for physical injury but not for mental
suffering absent perceptible physical manifestations. 94 The Spade
court, however, siqestepped this inconsistency and focused on ad
ministrative problems that would attend damage awards for mental
distress. 95 The impact requirement rule, which implied that certain
injuries were noncompensable, derived from anxiety over the possi
bility of fabricated claims. 96
This anxiety led to a puzzling result: Spade depicted mental
injury as a serious intrusion on a person's privacy. Compensation
for this injury, however, was relegated to the status of a parasitic
element of damages. 97 Chief Justice Holmes commented on this in
consistency: "The point decided in Spade v. Lynn. . .is not put as a
logical deduction from the general principles of liability in tort, but
as a limitation of those principles upon purely practical grounds."98
The grounds noted by Chief Justice Holmes are rooted in public
generally provocative than blows. . . . [T)he result was a rule which permitted recovery
for a gesture that might frighten the plaintiff for a moment, and denied it for menacing
words which kept him in terror of his life for a month." Id.
91. Id. at 51-52.
92. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
93. Id. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89; see Note, supra note 87, at 542.
94. "[F)right, terror, alarm or anxiety . . .constitute an actual injury. They do in
fact deprive one of enjoyment and of comfort, cause real suffering, and to a greater or
less extent disqualify one...from doing the duties of life." 168 Mass. at 288, 47 N.E. at
88.
95. "[T)he real reason for refusing damages sustained from mere fright. . .rests on
the ground that in practice it is impossible satisfactorily to administer any other
rule. . . ." Id. at 288, 47 N.E. at 89.
96. Note, supra note 87, at 544. Implicit in this requirement is a notion that emo
tional distress is "an intangible, evanescent something too elusive for the. . .common
law to handle." Goodrich, supra note 88, at 497.
97. 168 Mass. at 290, 47 N.E. at 90.
98. Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 577-78, 55 N.E. 380, 380 (1899).
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policy considerations. 99 Spade presupposed that emotional distress,
because it may be ephemeral, is not foreseeable. Thus, it would not
be an appropriate injury to sustain an independent cause of ac
tion.lOO This supposition apparently addressed itself to the fear of
frauduleJflt claims. If an independent tort claim required proof of
physical injury, the possibility of fraud was thought to be minimized
because physical injury ostensibly is easier to ascertain than mere
emotional distress. Other public policy considerations invoked to
justify the impact requirement rule included: The lack of precedent
for actions based solely on emotional distress; the trepidation that
allowance of recovery would increase fraudulent litigation; and the
fear of imprecision in proving and measuring damages from mental
trauma. lOl
Counterarguments, however, have effectively assuaged the anxi
eties attending actions for emotional distress. The.1ack of precedent,
for example, is not a valid reason for denying redress. The funda
mental nature of Anglo-American law, which permits progress
through judicial decision, contradicts such reasoning. No one would
argue that the law is eternally constrained so that it cannot evolve in
accordance with changing times and attitudes. 102
Public policy does not forbid increased litigation to redress
wrongs. This premise obviates concern about the potential flood of
lawsuits over emotional distress actions. lo3 There is no evidence that
judicial flexibility in allowing compensation for mental distress has
markedly increased litigation. I04 If the volume of litigation does in
crease, it has been suggested that the proper solution is an increase in
the number of courts, "not a decrease in the availability of
99. See generally 168 Mass. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89.
100. But Spade distinguished actions based on negligence from ones "where an
intention to cause mental distress or to hurt the feelings is shown, or is reasonably to be
inferred, as, for example, in cases of seduction, slander, malicious prosecution or ar
.
rest. . . ." Id.
Although willing to utilize [the impact requirement] when the wrongdoer was
guilty of simple negligence, the courts balked at protecting him when the quali
ty of the wrong was more reprehensible. Thus, the courts unanimously have
held that no impact is required to recover for mentally induced injury when the
culpability of the wrongdoer is great. . . .
Note, supra note 87, at 544-45 (footnote omitted).
101. Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 273-74.
102. See id. at 274. "[T]he common law has been and still is a living and growing
thing." Note, supra note 87, at 555 (citing Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198,215,20 So. 2d
243, 251 (1944».
103. Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 275.
104. See id.; Note, supra note 87, at 558-59.

1981)

_

SURVIVAL OF ACTION

275

justice." lOS
There is a valid interest in discouraging vexatious litigation, but
not at the expense of denying recovery for meritorious claims. It is
the business of the courts to distinguish between fraudulent and
valid claims on a case-by-case basis. "Denying all recovery merely
in anticipation of unjust claims would erode the courts' adjudicatory
function."I06 Courts are empowered to scrutinize "injuries under ap
propriate standards of proof, rejecting those claims which fail to
measure up to the standards."107 One such standard requires suffi
cient evidence to show a factual, causative nexus between the de
fendant's conduct and the alleged injury.108 In addition, proximate
cause must be demonstrated. I09
The difficulty in determining damages should not bar recovery
in an action for emotional distress. A plaintiff should not be pre
cluded from bringing an action simply because there is an element of
uncertainty in assessing damages. 110 'Where nonpecuniary loss re
sults, judgment for a monetary award may be an inartful device.
The difficulty in measuring attributable dollar amounts, however,
has not prevented these awards from being granted to satisfy physi
calor mental injuries. It is incumbent upon the jury, under judicial
supervision, to make this determination. III In short, public policy
justifications "are not so insuperable that they warrant denial of re
lief altogether."1l2 Basic tort doctrine requiring evidence of causa
tion and injury helps ameliorate the fears surrounding actions for
emotional distress. An allegation of intentional infliction of emo
tional distress must contain adequate proof of both the act that was
intended to cause the distress and the subsequent injury. This mini
mizes the potential for fraudulent litigation. I13
The interest in protecting emotional tranquility has been advo
105. Note, supra note 87, at 559. "[E)ven if liberal rules of recovery in this area do
create more litigation, the price is not too high. When wrongful acts cause serious injury,
there should be adequate forums to adjudge compensation." Id.
106. Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional IJistress in Accident Cases-The Ex
panding IJefinition of Liabi/i~-Dziokonski v. Babineau, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759,380
N.E.2d 1295, 1 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 795, 797-98 (1979).
107. Note, supra note 87, at 556-57.
108. Id. at 563.
109. Id. at 564.
110. National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 370 Mass. 425, 430, 348 N.E.2d
771, 774 (1976).
111. Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 277.
112. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338-39, 240 P.2d
282, 286 (1952).
113. See Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 273.
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cated forcefully.1l4 In 1936, Professor Calvert Magruder wrote,
"[n]o longer is it even approximately true that the law does not pre
tend to redress mental pain and anguish 'when the unlawful act com
plained of causes that alone.' "115 Although Professor Magruder
argued that mental anguish deserved legal protection, he cautioned
against extending this protection to trivial matters. "No pressing so
cial need requires that every abusive outburst be converted into a
tort. . . ." 116 This caveat is embodied within the Restatement (Sec
ond) oj' Torts, which strictly limits tort liability to cases wherein the
intentional conduct of the perpetrator is extreme and outrageous and
results in severe emotional distress.1l7 Massachusetts case law is in
accord with this standard. I IS
Shortly after Spade, Chief Justice Holmes hinted that intention
ally caused emotional distress may render a defendant liable but that
the question would remain open until it specifically arose. I 19 In Co
hen v. Lion Products CO.,120 Judge Wyzanski of the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts echoed Justice
Holmes and assumed that Massachusetts would impose tort liability
on a perpetrator of mental trauma. 121 This assumption was vali
dated in 1971, when the supreme judicial court decided George. Jus
tice Francis Quirico authored this opinion which recognized a new
basis of liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 122
114. See, e.g. , State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 337, 240
P.2d 282, 285 (1952); Goodrich, supra note 88, at 506-08.
115. Magruder, Menial and Emotional Disturhance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 1033, 1067 (1936).
116. Id. at 1053.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
118. Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396
N.E.2d 987; Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); George
v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971).
119. Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 578, 55 N.E. 380, 381 (1899).
120. 177 F. Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 1959).
121. Id. at 489.
122. 359 Mass. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. The George court reviewed the policy
justifications advanced in Spade that resulted in the "impact requirement": That any
other rule would be impossible to administer and that expanded recovery would not
encourage unjust claims. Id. at 247-48, 268 N.E.2d at 916-17. Justice Quirico allayed
these fears by postulating that these justifications would apply to any claim for emotional
distress, whether parasitic to a tort recognized at common law or independent of any
such tort. Id. at 250, 268 N.E.2d at 919. This, however, did not persuade the court to
abandon its proclivity toward protecting emotional tranquility. George evinced a confi
dence in factfinding tribunals to discriminate between fraudulent and just claims. "The
element of speculation is not present to any greater extent than in the usual tort claim
where medical evidence is offered and the issue of causation must be weighed with great
care." Id. at 251, 268 N.E.2d at 919.
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The court favored justice and logic by imposing liability for inten
tionally caused severe emotional distress with resulting bodily
harm. 123
A significant limitation can be gleaned from this holding in that
liability hinged on, among other things, proof of resulting bodily
harm. In 1976, five years after George, the supreme judicial court
expunged this limitation in Agis v. Howard Johnson CO.124 Agis in
volved an action against the owner and manager of a restaurant who
threatened to fire his waitresses in alphabetical order until the iden
tity of the one who had been stealing from the restaurant became
known. Plaintiff Agis was the first to be summarily dismissed. 125
She alleged that as a result of this action she sustained emotional
distress, mental anguish, and loss of wages. 126
Justice Quirico, in reviewing the facts, reiterated the analysis
contained in George and enlarged the scope of that holding by al
lowing Agis to recover for severe emotional distress without proving
resultant bodily harm.127 Agis employed a test that is defined suffi
ciently to obviate fears regarding fraud or outbreaks of litigation. 128
Agis minimized the distinction between the factfinding
problems juries may encounter in cases with resulting physical injury
and in those alleging only mental injury. Justice Quirico deemed the
difficulties inherent in both tasks to be approximately equal. He sug
gested that the jurors' own experiences could provide cues to aid
them in determining whether the alleged outrageous conduct would
cause mental distress. 129 He noted the jurors' awareness of the ex
tent and character of the disagreeable emotions that may result from
123. Id. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921.
124. 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
125. Id. at 141,355 N.E.2d at 317.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 144,355 N.E.2d at 318.
128. According to the court in Agis, a plaintiff must satisfy four elements to prevail
in a case for the intentional infliction of emotional distress where no bodily harm has
resulted:
It must be shown (I) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that
he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of
his conduct; (2) that the conduct was "extreme and outrageous," was "beyond
all possible bounds of decency" and was "utterly intolerable in a civilized com
munity";. . . . (3) that the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plain
tiffs distress;. . .and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff
was "severe" and of a nature "that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it."
. Id at 144-45,355 N.E.2d at 318-19 (citations omitted).
129. Id at 144,355 N.E.2d at 318; see State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff,
38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952).
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the defendant's conduct. 130 This suggests that jurors' empathy may
be more valid in weighing a claim for mental distress than their de
tached, objective judgment would be when the difficult medical
question of resulting physical injury arises.
The supreme judicial court's elimination of the physical impact
requirement in Agis highlights its determination that problems in
herent in allowing an action for emotional distress are "outweighed
by the unfair and illogical consequences of the denial of recognition
of such an independent tort."131 Agis' viability was affirmed in Har
rison, in which the requirement of physical damage was unnecessary
both in the context of triggering the survival statute's "damage to the
person" clause and in maintaining a cause of action for the inten
tional infliction of emotional distress. 132 Harrison's expansion of the
survival statute is a logical consequence of the elevation of emotional
distress to the status of a personal injury capable of sustaining an
independent tort action.
III.

ANALYSIS OF HARRISON

Survival of the emotional distress action in Harrison was predi
cated upon the divorce of the physical impact requirement from the
concept of "damage to the person."133 This holding aligned the Agis
standard, which accepts pure emotional distress as an actionable in
jury,134 with the survival statute. The Harrison court reviewed the
history regarding nonsurvival of actions and rejected previous, re
strictive readings of the survival statute. 135 As a result, the supreme
judicial court reversed the superior court's dismissal of Mrs. Harri
son's complaint.136
Chief Justice Hennessey first rejected the common-law dogma
130. 371 Mass. at 144,355 N.E.2d at 318 (citing State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v.
Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952».
131. Id at 142,355 N.E.2d at 317.
132. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479-80, 396 N.E.2d at 989.
133. Id
134. See generally Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954) (in accord
with trend in the law, recovery allowed for intentionally caused severe emotional distress
absent resulting physical harm); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.
2d 315 (1976) (recovery allowed for emotional distress absent showing of physical in
jury); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (best considered view recog
nizes an action for severe emotional distress without physical injury provided standards
safeguarding against false claims are met); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d
145 (1974) (cause of action may lie for severe emotional distress with or without showing
of accompanying bodily impact).
135. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2478-79, 396 N.E.2d at 989.
136. Id. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 988.
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precluding survival of tort actions after a party's death. J37 The Mas
sachusetts survival statute abrogated this common-law rule and ren
dered untenable appellees' reliance on it. 138 After noting that early
statutory interpretations of "damage to the person" evinced the nar
row view that damage of a physical character was required, the court
found these interpretations not germane to Harrison .139 Chief Jus
tice Hennessey argued that, as Massachusetts courts only recently
have countenanced claims for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, judicial constructions of the survival statute predating rec
ognition of this independent tort cannot be controlling. 140 Explicit in
the' statute is the legislature's intent that the list of surviving torts
supplements, rather than limits, those actions that survived at com
mon law. Under the traditional common-law rule no tort actions
survived. 141 The legislature, therefore, must have contemplated a
dynamic common law evolving in the cou,rts subsequent to the enact
ment of the survival statute. 142
The nonsurvival rule was spawned in an era of purely violent
torts and therefore is inapplicable today. 143 This distinction between
violent and nonviolent torts is not dispositive in any case because the
survival statute explicitly encompasses both violent torts, such as
battery, and those involving injuries deemed to cause "other damage
to the person."I44 The expansiveness of this phrase allowed Chief
Justice Hennessey to presume that the legislature's intent was to af
ford courts latitude to determine which unenumerated torts result in
"damage to the person." Harrison imputed a flexibility to the sur
vival statute by construing the intent to allow for changing judicial
conceptions of those injuries that would constitute legally
137. Id. at 2478-79, 396 N.E.2d at 989.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2479-80,396 N.E.2d at 989.
141. Id. at 2479, 396 N.E.2d at 989.
142. Id.
It would indeed be unfortunate, and perhaps disastrous, if we were required to
conclude that at some unknown point in the dim and distant past the law solidi
fied in a manner and to an extent which makes it impossible now to anwser a
question which had not arisen and been answered prior to that point. The
courts must, and do, have the continuing power and competence to answer
novel questions of law arising under ever changing conditions of the society
which the law is intended to serve.
George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244, 249, 268 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1971).
143. See notes 28-41 supra and accompanying text.
144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § I (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
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redressable damage. 145
Massachusetts cases typifying the statute's traditional, narrow
construction requiring physical impact l46 were distinguished by
Chief Justice Hennessey because they "were decided at a time when
the general attitude of the court toward mental or emotional distress
as a legally redressable harm was more restrictive than it is to
day."147 Judicial recognition of the right to mental security has in
creased because of medical knowledge concerning mental
processes. 148 "As the potential for harm inherent in mental stress
has become better understood, the courts have become increasingly
willing to protect mental security." 149 A serious and prolonged inva
sion of mental security can upset psychological balance, impair bod
ily functions, and result in severe emotional and physical injury.150
" 'The fact that it is more difficult to produce such an injury through
the operation of the mind than by direct physical means affords no
sufficient ground for refusing compensation, in an action at
law... .' "151
After departing from the impact requirement rule,152 Massachu
setts courts settled in the judicial mainstream by recognizing the re
ality of injuries induced through the invasion of mental security.153
Harrison summarized the two comparatively recent cases through
which the supreme judicial court liberalized its treatment of claims
based on emotional distress: George, in which the court first counte
nanced a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress with resulting physical injury; and Agis, in which the physi
cal injury limitation was abandoned. 154 Thus, the current philoso
phy of the Massachusetts judiciary regarding emotional injury has
145. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479, 396 N.E.2d at 989.
146. See cases cited notes 57 & 76 supra.
147. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479, 396 N.E.2d at 989.
148. Note, supra note 87, at 540.
149. Id. "A merely transitory or mild psychosomatic state caused by mental stress
should not be considered legally compensable. But if the invasion of mental security is
serious and prolonged, to the extent that the mind and emotions become distracted, and
dysfunctionally oriented, then a different conclusion is compelled." Id. at 555.
ISO. Id. at 554-55.
lSI. Id. at 551 (quoting Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 215,12 S.W. 59 (1890».
152. See Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976);
George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971). Massachusetts ex
pressly abandoned the impact rule of Spade in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555,
556, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296 (1978).
153. Note, supra note 87, at 554; see Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338,341, 210
S.E.2d 145, 147 (1974).
154. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479-80, 396 N.E.2d at 989.
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crystallized only in the last few years. This suggested to the court
that the attitude toward emotional distress, which fostered narrow
constructions of "damage to the person," no longer was viable.
Chief Justice Hennessey believed that it was time to reexamine the
survival statute and ascertain its bearing on the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 155
A.

Evaluation of the Language of the Survival Statute

An historical perspective reveals that Harrison contrasts the
stringent constructions requiring physical damage. 156 Judicial con
ceptions of legally redressable "damage to the person," as evidenced
by Harrison and Agis, have expanded to include emotional harm.
Chief Justice Hennessey asserted that the survival statute is
sufficiently flexible to allow for a change in the courts' attitude. 157
The operative phrase in the survival statute only refers to "damage
to the person."158 This phrase is not limited or altered by any de
scriptive clause. An adjective such as "physical" does not qualify
either of the words "damage" or "person." Rather, the phrase stands
alone and should be read as ordinary meaning dictates without any
modifying clause. 159
The court was satisfied that common understanding mandates
that the statutory language should not be constrained solely to dam
age of a physical character. 160 Under this analysis, a reasonable defi
nition of "damage to the person" includes mental injury. The kind
of the injury, not the form of the action, must control in deciding
whether to invoke the survival statute. 161 Contemporary judicial
treatment of emotional injury, as exemplified by Agis, is supported
by the medical profession's view that this kind of injury can be tangi
155. Id. at 2480, 396 N.E.2d at 989-90.
156. See cases cited notes 57 & 76 supra.
157. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479,396 N.E.2d at 989. This view of statutory intent
requires a focus upon the literal meaning of the words in the survival statute Id. at 2480,
396 N.E.2d at 990. There is precedent for this literalist approach in Putnam v. Savage,
244 Mass. 83, 138 N.E. 808 (1923): "This statute is general in terms and manifestly is
designed to include all classes of cases within its scope. It cO!Dprehends all such cases
whether then existing or thereafter created. . . ." Id. at 85, 138 N.E. at 809.
158. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1(2)(a) (West 1958).
159. "Person" is defined as "[a] being characterized by conscious apprehension,
rationality, and a moral sense...a being possessing or forming the subject of personal
ity." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1686 (1971).
160. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2480, 396 N.E.2d at 990.
161. Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 476, 84 N.E. 141, 142 (1908); Cutter v. Hamlen,
147 Mass. 471, 473, 18 N.E. 397, 398 (1888).
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ble and of serious consequence to the victim. 162 Such an attitude
belies the arbitrary dichotomy between corporal "body" and ephem
eral "feelings"; between the physical and the metaphysical, that ear
lier supreme judicial court decisions imposed.
Harrison failed to consider personal, intangible torts other than
intentional infliction of emotional distress. By imputing flexibility to
the survival statute, however, and interpreting "damage to the per
son" broadly, the court may have expanded the statute's purview to
encompass any significant injury to the mind or body.163 Clearly,
the court disfavored abatement of a valid tort action solely because
of a party's death. l64 Because "damage to the person" now contem
plates emotional injury, it may be inferred that the court would al
low survival in cases alleging defamation, malicious prosecution,
and invasion of privacy. 165
As the concept of "damage to the person" now markedly has
increased in scope, it appears that survival or abatement no longer
hinges on the character of the alleged injury. Rather, survival would
be allowed in cases alleging sufficiently severe mental as well as
physical harm. Such a construction of "damage to the person"
would comport with the broader concept of personal injury, which
"may be intangible or mental rather than tactile and physical."166
162. See notes 149-52 supra and accompanying text.
163. In Harrison, plaintiff alleged facts and circumstances that reasonably could
have led the trier of fact to conclude that Harrison suffered severe emotional distress
because of defendants' actions. Because the allegations were sufficient to warrant jury
consideration, it follows that the survival statute's operation to enable this consideration
was appropriate. See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2484, 396 N.E.2d at 992.
164. See notes 35-41 supra and accompanying text. A recent case decided by the
supreme judicial court reinforces this conclusion. In DuMont v. GOdbey, 1981 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 51,415 N.E.2d 188, an action by plaintiff wife against her former husband for
alimony and assignment of property was held to survive the husband's death. In making
this determination, the court cited Harrison, explaining, "[wJe have recently had occasion
to consider rules as to survival of actions and we have found the reasons for non-survival
lacking in current force." Id. at 56, 415 N.E.2d at 191.
165. This inference was first drawn by Chief Justice Shaw, who wrote that if "dam
ages to the person" were to be taken to include non-physical torts, it would also be ex
tended "to slander and every other possible case of tort." Smith v. Sherman, 58 Mass. (4
Cush.) 408, 413 (1849). More recent courts have agreed with Chief Justice Shaw. See
generally Cohen v. Lion Prods. Co., 177 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D. Mass. 1959); Moyer v.
Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 341 A.2d 441 (1975).
The analogy has been explained aptly by a commentator in the following fashion:
"Since the modem theory of torts is essentially compensatory, [tJhere seems to be no
valid reason why even purely personal actions such as defamation and malicious prose
cution should [not survive the death of the tortfeasorJ." Oppenheim, The Survival of
Tort Actions and the Action jor Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TuL. L.
REV. 386,421 (1942).
166. In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 492, III N.E. 379, 381 (1916).

1981]

SURVIVAL OF ACTION

283

Harrison repudiated the distinction between "personal injury" and
"damage to the person" by envisioning mental trauma as being
within the ambit of the survival statute.

B. Po/icy Considerations

Apart from drawing conclusions from statutory language, Chief
Justice Hennessey considered whether, as a matter of policy, inten
tional infliction of emotional distress actions should survive. A spe
cific fear attending these actions is that the difficulty in proving
emotional injury might increase the potential for fraud. The poten
tial for fraud supposedly is reduced if both the victim and the
tortfeasor are alive at the time of the suit. The Harrison court fol
lowed Agis in rejecting this argument. 167
The statutory provision allowing assault actions to survive
evinces the legislature's opinion that courts are competent to decide,
after the death of a party, questions involving mental and emotional
harm. Assault actions, which expressly survive, may involve only
slight harm or even a mere apprehension of bodily contact. 168 Con
versely, in order for there to be recovery, injury resulting from inten
tional infliction of emotional distress must be severe. 169 An
allegation of tortious invasion of mental tranquility by assault would
survive. The same rule should apply if the allegation is based on the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Abatement of the
latter action, in light of the survival of assault actions, would be il
logical. Chief Justice Hennessey was disdainful of the anomaly that
would result if this were to occur.170 The statute does not compel
such a result and it is dubious that the legislature would have in
tended such an illogical consequence.
Harrison countered defendants' claim that the difficulty in proof
and the danger of fraud necessitated the court's nonrecognition of
actions for intentionally caused emotional distress. Chief Justice
Hennessey was mindful of these inherent threats but was not con
vinced that they compelled denial of relief for serious invasions of
peace of mind. The Chief Justice echoed Agis by recognizjng that
167. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2482,396 N.E.2d at 990-91.
168. Id. at 2481, 396 N.E.2d at 990.
169. Id. at 2482, 396 N.E.2d at 990.
170. Id. at 2481, 396 N.E.2d at 990. In Cohen v. Lion Prods. Co., 177 F. Supp. 486
(D. Mass. 1959), the court stated that assault required proof of physical contact which
marked the essential difference between that tort and intentional infiiction of emotional
distress. Id. at 489. Because Harrison obviates the physical injury requirement, this dif
ference is no longer relevant.
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courts and juries are charged with determining the validity or inva·
lidity of claims. That the task may be difficult does not excuse them
of their duty to perform it. 171 Indeed, the nature of intentional inflic·
tion of emotional distress mitigates the potential for excessive fraud.
Under Agis, the plaintiff must demonstrate what the defendant did
or said that led to the complaint. The trier of fact then must decide
whether those actions or words would have caused severe emotional
distress in a reasonable person. 172 As in the surviving actions of bat·
tery and contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress actions
carry standard of proof requirements. 173 Chief Justice Hennessey
therefore predicted that the confusion resulting from a party's death
would not be extraordinary.174
In giving credence to the jury's competence, Chief Justice Hen·
nessey defused the impact of a problem presented by an exception to
the hearsay rule. 175 In civil cases, a decedent's declarations can be
introduced into evidence as long as the statement was made in good
faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant. 176 Thus, a
plaintiff may introduce prior, good faith statements of a deceased
victim about his susceptibility and resulting distress, while contem·
poraneously avoiding the possibility of cross·examination. The
court, however, concluded that the legislative decision to create this
exception to the hearsay rule applied in all civil cases. Also, the
plaintiffs benefit in avoiding cross·examination counterbalanced the
burden of not being able to elicit testimony directly from the victim.
The hearsay exception does not require abatement of the cause of
action by inordinately favoring the plaintiff. 177
IV.

CONCLUSION

Early cases interpreting the survival statute required the victim
to endure physical injury in order to prevent abatement of the action
171. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2482,396 N.E.2d at 990-91 (quoting Agis, 371 Mass. at
144, 355 N.E.2d at 318).
172. 371 Mass. at 144-45,355 N.E.2d at 318-19.
173.

Id.

174.

1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2483, 396 N.E.2d at 991.

175.

Id.

176. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (West 1959) provides:
Admissibility of declaration of decedent. In any action or other civil judicial
proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evi
dence as hearsay or as private conversation between husband and wife, as the
case may be, if the coun finds that it was made in good faith and upon the
personal knowledge of the declarant.
177. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2483, 396 N.E.2d at 991.
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at the death of a party. This constraint on survivorship stemmed
from blind adherence to the archaic, common-law nonsurvival rule.
The Massachusetts survival statute, however, was designed to abro
gate this anachronistic rule.
Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co., 178 focused on
intentional infliction of emotional distress actions. A cause of action
based on emotional distress traditionally would have fallen outside
the ambit of the survival statute if evidence of physical injury were
lacking. The action would have abated at the death of a party.
Nothing in the survival statute, however, requires such a restrictive
construction.
Statutory language enabling survival of actions merely requires
"damage to the person" that is not qualified by the imposition of a
physical injury requirement. The expansiveness of this phrase, and
the statute's purpose in abrogating the nonsurvival rule, indicate that
causes of action based on emotional harm, as well as physical dam
age, should survive. The statute's explicit provision for the survival
of assault actions, which do not necessarily involve physical damage,
supports this interpretation.
Harrison adopted the current standard regarding intentional in
fliction of emotional distress actions. This standard, as expressed in
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 179 is that outrageous conduct must re
sult in severe emotional distress for there to be an actionable tort.
Harrison was based on a complaint alleging this degree of emotional
distress. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied the
Agis standard, which obviates a showing of ensuing physical harm.
By allowing survival of this action, Harrison juxtaposed the survival
statute's phrase "damage to the person" with the standard requiring
severe emotional distress absent some perceptible physical injury. In
doing so, Harrison incorporated a fair and justifiable interpretaton of
"damage to the person" and thereby furthered the purpose of abro
gating the antiquated nonsurvival rule.
Franklin H. Caplan

178. Id. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 987.
179. 371 Mass. at 140,355 N.E.2d at 315.

